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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-99143 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Keep the predicate limit separate from program capacity predicate_parse() adds two to nr_preds to reserve the terminal TRUE and FALSE entries. It also uses that increased value as the limit for parsed predicates. If the initial count is smaller than the number actually parsed, the program can fill the allocation and subsequent accesses can go past its end. Keep nr_preds as the predicate limit and use a separate value for the allocation size. This leaves space for both terminal entries and a zeroed entry when parsing stops at the limit. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99163 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/histograms: Reject non-stacktrace fields for synthetic stacktrace fields In check_synth_field(), when a synthetic event field is a stacktrace (field->is_stack) and the histogram field is not a "long[" stacktrace array, validation falls through to the generic size and signedness comparison. Because parse_synth_field() sets a stacktrace field's type to "__data_loc unsigned long[]", its size is sizeof(u64) and synth_field_signed() marks it as signed. Consequently, any 8-byte signed scalar histogram field passes the fallback check, and its scalar value is subsequently dereferenced as a kernel stacktrace pointer in get_field_size() and trace_stack(). Furthermore, checking strstr(hist_field->type, "long[") is insufficient because tracepoint fields defined with __bitmask() or __rel_bitmask() also have type "__data_loc unsigned long[]" or "__rel_loc unsigned long[]", whilst create_hist_field() treats them as 4-byte scalar values without HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE. Propagate HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE to variable references and field variables (whilst excluding variable aliases from per-element stacktrace capture), and reject any mismatch between HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE and field->is_stack in check_synth_field(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-99110 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix heap overflow in cifs_do_set_acl() cifs_set_acl() validates ACL size using posix_acl_xattr_size(): 4 + (count * 8) // 4-byte header + 8 bytes per ACE cifs_do_set_acl() then calls posix_acl_to_cifs() to write the CIFS wire format into the same buffer: 6 + (count * 10) // 6-byte header + 10 bytes per ACE An ACL that passes the xattr-based check in cifs_set_acl() can overflow the heap when posix_acl_to_cifs() writes the larger CIFS format. Validate the CIFS format size against the remaining buffer space and USHRT_MAX before converting--data_count is __u16, so sizes above USHRT_MAX truncate the on-wire packet length, causing the server to apply a partial ACL. Replace MaxDataCount = 1000 with min(CIFSMaxBufSize, USHRT_MAX). | ||||
| CVE-2026-99152 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: libiscsi: Validate the task named by a management response __iscsi_complete_pdu() fetches the task for five response types from one place and checks only that the index resolved: case ISCSI_OP_LOGOUT_RSP: case ISCSI_OP_LOGIN_RSP: case ISCSI_OP_TEXT_RSP: case ISCSI_OP_SCSI_TMFUNC_RSP: case ISCSI_OP_NOOP_IN: task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, hdr->itt); if (!task) return ISCSI_ERR_BAD_ITT; iscsi_itt_to_task() bounds the index against cmds_max and looks at nothing else, so a target can name any slot in the pool, including one that has never been used. task->conn is then NULL, and both iscsi_nop_out_rsp() and iscsi_complete_task() dereference it. One unsolicited NOP-In is enough; a Text Response carrying the same ITT crashes in iscsi_complete_task() instead. Require the task to be in flight and not a SCSI command, the way iscsi_itt_to_ctask() does for the command opcodes. [ 6.298634] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 6.298642] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067] [ 6.298652] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 111 Comm: iscsistart Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISCSI1-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 6.298654] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 6.298656] RIP: 0010:iscsi_nop_out_rsp.constprop.0+0x46/0x160 [ 6.298691] Code: c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 58 48 8d 7d 60 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 c0 00 00 00 48 8b 45 60 48 39 c3 74 50 48 b8 00 [ 6.298698] RSP: 0018:ffff88806c907be8 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 6.298701] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888006116800 RCX: 0000000000000020 [ 6.298702] RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff88800525d578 RDI: 0000000000000060 [ 6.298703] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 6.298706] R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 6.298706] R13: 000000000000002e R14: ffff8880056eb440 R15: ffff888006116800 [ 6.298707] FS: 00007fc02d1c2740(0000) GS:ffff8880b29bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6.298710] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6.298711] CR2: 000055fe3b56ddf8 CR3: 00000000053b9004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 6.298712] PKRU: 55555554 [ 6.298713] Call Trace: [ 6.298714] <IRQ> [ 6.298714] __iscsi_complete_pdu+0x13a8/0x22a0 [ 6.298758] iscsi_complete_pdu+0x54/0xa0 [ 6.298759] iscsi_tcp_hdr_recv_done+0x870/0x2c80 [ 6.298778] iscsi_tcp_recv_skb+0x31e/0xec0 [ 6.298800] iscsi_sw_tcp_recv+0x12f/0x390 [ 6.298804] __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810 [ 6.298812] iscsi_sw_tcp_data_ready+0x18b/0x510 [ 6.298814] tcp_rcv_established+0x1f56/0x3a00 [ 6.298842] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x449/0x960 [ 6.298847] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2245/0x3bc0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-99216 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Drivers: hv: Don't reset VMBus connection state on error/exit paths In two places, current code forces vmbus_connection.conn_state to DISCONNECTED prior to calling vmbus_disconnect(). But vmbus_disconnect() calls vmbus_initiate_unload(), which unloads the VMBus connection only if the conn_state is CONNECTED. Consequently, the connection remains and the Hyper-V host might continue to send messages or post VMBus interrupts. The problem was introduced in commit 74347a99e73ae ("x86/Hyper-V: Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback"), in that vmbus_initiate_unload() started checking the current connection state before doing the unload. This commit removed some occurrences where conn_state was forced to DISCONNECTED, but these two remained, apparently due to an oversight at the time. Fix this by not forcing conn_state to DISCONNECTED during VMBus exit, or if a failure occurs when establishing the connection in the first place. Whatever value conn_state has at the time is then read by vmbus_initiate_unload() to determine if there is a connection to be unloaded. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99212 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() hands the return value of rdma_resolve_route() straight back to the rdma_cm on RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED. A synchronous failure there - -ENOMEM from the route work allocation, an SA query that cannot be set up, a RoCE route with no usable device - makes addr_handler() destroy the id the event was delivered on. That id is ic->i_cm_id, and nothing clears the pointer: the connection sits in RDS_CONN_CONNECTING with a freed id until its shutdown calls rdma_disconnect() and rdma_destroy_id() on it. The ROUTE_RESOLVED case already avoids this: rds_ib_cm_initiate_connect() forces a zero return while ic->i_cm_id == cm_id, as the comment there explains. Do the same here - drop the connection and return 0 - so the id stays RDS's to destroy from the shutdown, and the reconnect gets a fresh one. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99203 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pipe: preserve existing fasync readers on writer setup failure F_SETFL and FIOASYNC decide whether to invoke ->fasync() before pipe_fasync() takes pipe->mutex. Two enables of one O_RDWR FIFO can therefore both enter the callback. fasync_helper() allocates before checking for an existing entry. If the first enable installs both entries, a second enable can update the reader entry and then fail the allocation for the writer entry. The error path removes the pre-existing reader entry, clearing FASYNC while the writer entry remains registered. __fput() then skips ->fasync(), so a later pipe notification can dereference the freed file or its f_owner. An unprivileged memory-pressure reproducer triggers a KASAN slab-use-after-free in send_sigio() through this path. Keep the reader helper's result and undo the registration only if this call added it. The pipe mutex serializes changes to both lists, so a failed new registration still removes its reader, while a failed duplicate preserves the existing registrations and FASYNC. Successful duplicate enables continue to update fa_fd as before. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99173 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventfs: Free the eventfs_inode after an rcu grace period too tracefs_d_revalidate() reads ->is_freed of the eventfs_inode that dentry->d_fsdata points to, and ->d_revalidate() is called in rcu pathwalk mode with nothing but rcu_read_lock() held. The dentry itself stays around for such a walker, but tracefs_d_release() drops its reference to the eventfs_inode when the dentry is killed, and release_ei() then frees it after a grace period of eventfs_srcu. An SRCU grace period doesn't wait for rcu_read_lock() sections, so the walker can read an eventfs_inode that is already gone. With a pathwalk held up in tracefs_d_revalidate() while the dentry goes away: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tracefs_d_revalidate+0x76/0x90 Read of size 1 at addr ff1100010152d8d0 by task walker/97 Call Trace: <TASK> tracefs_d_revalidate+0x76/0x90 lookup_fast+0x320/0x640 path_lookupat+0x160/0xb00 filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0 vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0 vfs_fstatat+0x4d/0x90 __do_sys_newfstatat+0xa0/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x10e/0x5e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [...] Allocated by task 1: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x249/0x560 eventfs_create_dir+0x7a/0x590 event_create_dir+0x2fb/0xcf0 trace_add_event_call+0xbf/0x150 [...] Freed by task 11: kfree+0x1db/0x5b0 srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x3a3/0x620 process_one_work+0x937/0x1810 worker_thread+0x4f1/0xd60 Before commit 8e556432477e ("eventfs: Use SRCU for freeing eventfs_inodes") release_ei() used call_rcu(), which covered the walker, while eventfs_iterate() needs the SRCU grace period. Wait for both and chain call_rcu() from the SRCU callback. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99170 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: a mount that copy_tree() leaves out can't take over a lock Since commit c62a4766937e ("move_mount: transfer MNT_LOCKED") a mount can be moved beneath a locked mount. The lock moves from the old cover to the new mount which takes over the job of hiding what's under it and the old cover can be unmounted. That works as long as the new mount stays. But the caller picks the new mount and copy_tree() leaves a mount of a mount namespace file out of every copy made without CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE, together with everything mounted on it, and never looks at MNT_LOCKED. unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) and mount propagation make such copies. So a task that is root in its own user namespace gets rid of a locked cover on a file without a race and without touching the filesystem below it. It makes a child with a mount namespace of its own, binds the child's /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt beneath the cover with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH, which hands the lock to that bind, and calls unshare(CLONE_NEWNS). The new mount namespace has nothing on the file. That's the usual way to mask a single file, a bind of /dev/null or of an empty file. With a bind of an ordinary file the file stays covered. copy_tree() already refuses to leave out a locked unbindable mount with -EPERM since commit df7342b24018 ("mount: Don't allow copying MNT_UNBINDABLE|MNT_LOCKED mounts"). Do the same for a locked mount of a mount namespace file. That also covers a tree copied with CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE and attached into a mount namespace of another user namespace where lock_mnt_tree() locks it. Note that unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) and clone(CLONE_NEWNS) fail with EPERM from such a mount namespace from then on. The mount can't be left out and it can't be unmounted. And refuse to move a mount of a mount namespace file beneath a locked mount in the first place. Otherwise the task ends up with a mount it can't unmount and an unshare() that fails for good. Chris also found a second mount that goes away by itself, a clone of an automounted mount that shrink_submounts() took along with its parent. Commit f78ddcc87224 ("namespace: never expire a locked mount") took care of that one. Chris's reproducer is appended. Mode nsfile reads SECRET after the unshare() on 7.3-rc7, with this patch the move_mount() fails with EINVAL and the file stays covered. nsfile-control uses an ordinary file and reads MASK both ways. // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Get rid of a locked cover with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. * * The "admin" (root) makes a tmpfs W: * W/D file, holds SECRET, covered by a bind of a file with MASK * W/Dd/inner file, holds SECRET, Dd is covered by a bind of a directory * whose "inner" holds MASK * W/own directory of uid 1000 with the file "mine" and the * directory "minedir", whose "inner" holds MINE * W/dbg debugfs, mode 755. dbg/tracing is an automount point * The "attacker" is uid 1000. It enters a new user namespace with a new mount * namespace, so W and both covers are locked there. * * usage: prog MODE * plain put a bind of own/mine beneath the cover of D, unmount the cover * nsfile put a bind of the mount namespace file of a child beneath the * cover of D, then unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) * nsfile-control the same with a bind of own/mine * shrink put a bind of the automounted tracefs beneath the cover of Dd, * unmount the cover, put a tmpfs beneath W, call umount(W), which fails * shrink-control the same with a bind of own/minedir * The environment variable AUTOMOUNT_DIR names another automount point for "shrink". */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <grp.h> #include <sched.h> #include <signal.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-99148 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: keep the eviction fence until the last handle is closed amdgpu_gem_object_close() detaches the user queue eviction fence from the BO before it checks bo_va->ref_count, so closing any handle of a BO removes the fence, even when the file still has another handle to the BO and the bo_va with its GPU mappings stays. The BO can then be evicted without suspending the user queues of the file, which keep accessing it through mappings that are only marked for update. Seen on navi31 with a SDMA user queue: a BO opened twice in the same file (GEM_FLINK + GEM_OPEN) loses its eviction fence when the second handle is closed (traced attach/detach of the fence): attach bo=ffff8c78a6c84c00 GEM_CLOSE handle=7 detach bo=ffff8c78a6c84c00 while handle 6 and the mapping are still in use. Only detach the fence when the last reference to the bo_va goes away, matching amdgpu_gem_object_open(), which attaches it only when the bo_va is created. With this the fence stays until the file is closed. (cherry picked from commit 8387982f03d4026b7dc11b0b5e3118298eee4d6a) | ||||
| CVE-2026-99142 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Check operator stack capacity before pushing predicate_parse() uses the first operator stack entry before processing any opening parentheses. A push then increments top before writing. The existing check still permits that write when top already points to the last allocated entry, which can access beyond the operator stack. Reject the push when top reaches the last allocated entry. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99136 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-crypt: fix a tiny race condition in crypt_dec_pending crypt_dec_pending reads io->error before calling atomic_dec_and_test. Another context, for example crypt_endio called from an interrupt, may set io->error and drop its reference between the read and the decrement. crypt_dec_pending then drops the last reference and completes the bio with the stale status - so a read that failed and was never decrypted, or a write that failed, is reported as successful. The read was placed before the decrement by commit b35f8caa0890 ("dm crypt: wait for endio to complete before destruction"), because that commit freed dm_crypt_io before calling bio_endio. This is no longer the case, dm_crypt_io lives in the per-bio data now. Read io->error after atomic_dec_and_test instead. atomic_dec_and_test is fully ordered, so no additional barrier is needed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99131 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: fix capability check in xfs An user reported a bug where he managed to evade group's quota by changing a file's gid to a different group id the same user belonged to, even though quotas were enforced on both gids and the file's size was big enough to exceed the quota's hardlimit. Commit eba0549bc7d1 replaced a capable() call by a has_capability_noaudit() to prevent unnecessary selinux audit messages. Turns out that both calls have slightly different semantics even though their documentation seems similar. Where in a nutshell: capable() - Tests the task's effective credentials has_ns_capability_noaudit() - Tests the task's real credentials This most of the time has no practical difference but in some cases like changing attrs (specifically group id in this case) through a NFS client this will allow the quota code to use XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES, effectively bypassing quota accounting checks. Using instead ns_capable_noaudit() should fix this issue and prevent selinux audit messages. This also fix the remaining calls to has_capability_noaudit() | ||||
| CVE-2026-99123 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: validate packet source for connected sockets virtio_transport_recv_pkt() looks up sockets first by the full source and destination tuple, then by destination only in the bound table. The fallback is needed for listening and connecting sockets, but sockets remain in the bound table after connect(), so it can also return a non-listening socket. The fallback does not validate the source address. In TCP_SYN_SENT, a RESPONSE from an unrelated source can transition the victim socket to TCP_ESTABLISHED while its stored remote address remains unchanged. Subsequent RW packets from that source are delivered through the same destination-only fallback. This was reproduced with capability-empty processes under different UIDs. The attacker discovered the target tuple through unprivileged AF_VSOCK sock_diag and caused the victim socket to read 16 attacker-chosen bytes; the intended peer-side socket read 0 of those 16 bytes. Add vsock_check_source() to validate the transport, source port and source CID against the peer stored in a non-listening socket. The local transport is the CID exception because its packets are generated internally with VMADDR_CID_LOCAL as their source, including connections using CID aliases. Use the helper after lock_sock() in the virtio receive path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99117 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: mcast: don't truncate the port group walk on teardown __br_multicast_disable_port_ctx() and br_multicast_del_port() walk port->mglist with hlist_for_each_entry_safe(). However, br_multicast_find_del_pg() can also delete other entries from the same list through br_multicast_fwd_src_remove() or __fwd_del_star_excl(). If such an entry is the iterator's saved next node, hlist_del_init() clears its ->next and terminates the walk early. The reproducer triggers this in both teardown walks, leaving port groups in the bridge mdb with a dangling ->key.port after del_nbp() frees the port: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mdb_fill_info+0x1191/0x1320 __mdb_fill_info+0x1191/0x1320 br_mdb_dump+0x594/0xe40 rtnl_mdb_dump+0x1cf/0x5d0 Use hlist_del_init_rcu() to unlink the group while preserving ->next. br_multicast_del_pg() and the teardown walks run under br->multicast_lock. The GC worker must acquire the same lock before detaching the group for destruction, so the node remains alive while the walk uses the preserved pointer. Preserving ->next means a walk can now reach a group that an earlier iteration already deleted as a side effect. That group is off mp->ports, so br_multicast_find_del_pg() would fall through its port scan and hit the trailing WARN_ON(1). Skip such groups at the top of that helper: a port group is put on port->mglist when it is created and only unlinked when it is deleted, so hlist_unhashed() identifies exactly this case. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99116 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: psp: do not inherit the Rx association on clone sk->psp_assoc sits past sk_dontcopy_end, so sock_copy() copies it into every socket accepted from a listener without taking a reference, while inet_sock_destruct() puts for every inet socket. psp_twsk_init() does refcount_inc() for the timewait socket, so a child closing through TIME_WAIT cancels its own put and leaves the association with one reference and N timewait sockets holding the same pointer. Closing the listener frees it, and the timewait timers then put freed memory. Rejecting the association on a listening socket is not sufficient: a socket can acquire one while established and then be turned back into a listener, because tcp_disconnect() leaves sk->psp_assoc in place. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in psp_twsk_assoc_free+0x6f/0xf0 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888110f9255c by task swapper/7/0 psp_twsk_assoc_free+0x6f/0xf0 inet_twsk_put+0xda/0x1b0 call_timer_fn+0x53/0x2e0 __run_timers+0x764/0xa80 Freed by task 99: kfree+0x1a7/0x500 process_one_work+0x7ec/0x1100 An association carries a per-connection SPI and key, so a child must not inherit the parent's. Clear it on clone. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99112 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_flower: validate mask pointer after nla_next() fl_set_enc_opt() iterates the key's nested tunnel-option attributes with nla_for_each_attr() while advancing a single mask pointer via nla_next() at the bottom of each loop, so the mask cursor is driven by the number of key attributes rather than by the mask's own attributes. The nla_ok() added by commit c96adff956191 ("cls_flower: call nla_ok() before nla_next()") only validates the mask pointer that was just consumed; the pointer produced by nla_next() is used by the next iteration (fl_set_geneve_opt() and siblings) without any validation. The mask's nested attributes are validated with NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL, which merely warns on trailing bytes that do not form a complete attribute. A mask carrying one valid attribute plus 1-3 residue bytes (or a non-aligned attribute length making msk_depth negative) therefore reaches the next iteration with msk_depth != 0, so neither the !msk_depth check in fl_set_enc_opt() nor the !depth check in the per-type helpers fires. nla_type() then reads past the mask payload and nla_parse_nested_deprecated() iterates with an nla_len taken from those bytes, reading well beyond the mask attribute (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds read in __nla_validate_parse from fl_change()). Validate the advanced mask pointer as well: when the mask is not legitimately exhausted (msk_depth != 0) and the new pointer fails nla_ok(), reject the filter with -EINVAL. An exactly exhausted mask still skips the check, preserving exact-match behaviour for the remaining key attributes. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99107 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix incorrect MFT record pointer passed to ntfs_attr_record_resize ntfs_new_attr_flags() passes the wrong MFT record to ntfs_attr_record_resize(). When the attribute is in an extent record, ctx->mrec points to the extent but the function receives the base record pointer m, causing incorrect size calculations in memmove. Fix by passing ctx->mrec (the actual MFT record containing the attribute) instead of m (the base MFT record) to ntfs_attr_record_resize(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-99099 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/CPU/AMD: Fix AMD TLBI Erratum #1718 The processor may fail to invalidate a TLB entry while executing an INVLPGB/TLBSYNC instruction pair. Detect the erratum and apply a software workaround when a microcode fix is not present. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99094 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-31 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: fix TX descriptor bounds check btintel_pcie_prepare_tx() uses tfd_index to access the TFD and data buffer arrays before the index is advanced modulo txq->count. An index equal to txq->count is one past the end of both arrays, so reject it in the bounds check. | ||||