| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/privcmd: fix error exit of privcmd_ioctl_dm_op()
The error exit of privcmd_ioctl_dm_op() is calling unlock_pages()
potentially with pages being NULL, leading to a NULL dereference.
Additionally lock_pages() doesn't check for pin_user_pages_fast()
having been completely successful, resulting in potentially not
locking all pages into memory. This could result in sporadic failures
when using the related memory in user mode.
Fix all of that by calling unlock_pages() always with the real number
of pinned pages, which will be zero in case pages being NULL, and by
checking the number of pages pinned by pin_user_pages_fast() matching
the expected number of pages. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: call __md_stop_writes in md_stop
From the link [1], we can see raid1d was running even after the path
raid_dtr -> md_stop -> __md_stop.
Let's stop write first in destructor to align with normal md-raid to
fix the KASAN issue.
[1]. https://lore.kernel.org/linux-raid/CAPhsuW5gc4AakdGNdF8ubpezAuDLFOYUO_sfMZcec6hQFm8nhg@mail.gmail.com/T/#m7f12bf90481c02c6d2da68c64aeed4779b7df74a |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Don't redirect packets with invalid pkt_len
Syzbot found an issue [1]: fq_codel_drop() try to drop a flow whitout any
skbs, that is, the flow->head is null.
The root cause, as the [2] says, is because that bpf_prog_test_run_skb()
run a bpf prog which redirects empty skbs.
So we should determine whether the length of the packet modified by bpf
prog or others like bpf_prog_test is valid before forwarding it directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
skmsg: Fix wrong last sg check in sk_msg_recvmsg()
Fix one kernel NULL pointer dereference as below:
[ 224.462334] Call Trace:
[ 224.462394] __tcp_bpf_recvmsg+0xd3/0x380
[ 224.462441] ? sock_has_perm+0x78/0xa0
[ 224.462463] tcp_bpf_recvmsg+0x12e/0x220
[ 224.462494] inet_recvmsg+0x5b/0xd0
[ 224.462534] __sys_recvfrom+0xc8/0x130
[ 224.462574] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1df/0x2e0
[ 224.462606] ? __do_page_fault+0x2de/0x500
[ 224.462635] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x24/0x30
[ 224.462660] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
[ 224.462709] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
In commit 9974d37ea75f ("skmsg: Fix invalid last sg check in
sk_msg_recvmsg()"), we change last sg check to sg_is_last(),
but in sockmap redirection case (without stream_parser/stream_verdict/
skb_verdict), we did not mark the end of the scatterlist. Check the
sk_msg_alloc, sk_msg_page_add, and bpf_msg_push_data functions, they all
do not mark the end of sg. They are expected to use sg.end for end
judgment. So the judgment of '(i != msg_rx->sg.end)' is added back here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, cgroup: Fix kernel BUG in purge_effective_progs
Syzkaller reported a triggered kernel BUG as follows:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:925!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 194 Comm: detach Not tainted 5.19.0-14184-g69dac8e431af #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__cgroup_bpf_detach+0x1f2/0x2a0
Code: 00 e8 92 60 30 00 84 c0 75 d8 4c 89 e0 31 f6 85 f6 74 19 42 f6 84
28 48 05 00 00 02 75 0e 48 8b 80 c0 00 00 00 48 85 c0 75 e5 <0f> 0b 48
8b 0c5
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000055bdb0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888100ec0800 RCX: ffffc900000f1000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff888100ec4578
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888100ec0800 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888100ec4000
R13: 000000000000000d R14: ffffc90000199000 R15: ffff888100effb00
FS: 00007f68213d2b80(0000) GS:ffff88813bc80000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055f74a0e5850 CR3: 0000000102836000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cgroup_bpf_prog_detach+0xcc/0x100
__sys_bpf+0x2273/0x2a00
__x64_sys_bpf+0x17/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f68214dbcb9
Code: 08 44 89 e0 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
f0 ff8
RSP: 002b:00007ffeb487db68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000b RCX: 00007f68214dbcb9
RDX: 0000000000000090 RSI: 00007ffeb487db70 RDI: 0000000000000009
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000012 R09: 0000000b00000003
R10: 00007ffeb487db70 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeb487dc20
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000055f74a1011b0
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Repetition steps:
For the following cgroup tree,
root
|
cg1
|
cg2
1. attach prog2 to cg2, and then attach prog1 to cg1, both bpf progs
attach type is NONE or OVERRIDE.
2. write 1 to /proc/thread-self/fail-nth for failslab.
3. detach prog1 for cg1, and then kernel BUG occur.
Failslab injection will cause kmalloc fail and fall back to
purge_effective_progs. The problem is that cg2 have attached another prog,
so when go through cg2 layer, iteration will add pos to 1, and subsequent
operations will be skipped by the following condition, and cg will meet
NULL in the end.
`if (pos && !(cg->bpf.flags[atype] & BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI))`
The NULL cg means no link or prog match, this is as expected, and it's not
a bug. So here just skip the no match situation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix a data-race around bpf_jit_limit.
While reading bpf_jit_limit, it can be changed concurrently via sysctl,
WRITE_ONCE() in __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(). The size of bpf_jit_limit
is long, so we need to add a paired READ_ONCE() to avoid load-tearing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Do mark_chain_precision for ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO
Precision markers need to be propagated whenever we have an ARG_CONST_*
style argument, as the verifier cannot consider imprecise scalars to be
equivalent for the purposes of states_equal check when such arguments
refine the return value (in this case, set mem_size for PTR_TO_MEM). The
resultant mem_size for the R0 is derived from the constant value, and if
the verifier incorrectly prunes states considering them equivalent where
such arguments exist (by seeing that both registers have reg->precise as
false in regsafe), we can end up with invalid programs passing the
verifier which can do access beyond what should have been the correct
mem_size in that explored state.
To show a concrete example of the problem:
0000000000000000 <prog>:
0: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80)
1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 76)
2: r3 = r1
3: r3 += 4
4: if r3 > r2 goto +18 <LBB5_5>
5: w2 = 0
6: *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) = r2
7: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0)
8: r2 = 1
9: if w1 == 0 goto +1 <LBB5_3>
10: r2 = -1
0000000000000058 <LBB5_3>:
11: r1 = 0 ll
13: r3 = 0
14: call bpf_ringbuf_reserve
15: if r0 == 0 goto +7 <LBB5_5>
16: r1 = r0
17: r1 += 16777215
18: w2 = 0
19: *(u8 *)(r1 + 0) = r2
20: r1 = r0
21: r2 = 0
22: call bpf_ringbuf_submit
00000000000000b8 <LBB5_5>:
23: w0 = 0
24: exit
For the first case, the single line execution's exploration will prune
the search at insn 14 for the branch insn 9's second leg as it will be
verified first using r2 = -1 (UINT_MAX), while as w1 at insn 9 will
always be 0 so at runtime we don't get error for being greater than
UINT_MAX/4 from bpf_ringbuf_reserve. The verifier during regsafe just
sees reg->precise as false for both r2 registers in both states, hence
considers them equal for purposes of states_equal.
If we propagated precise markers using the backtracking support, we
would use the precise marking to then ensure that old r2 (UINT_MAX) was
within the new r2 (1) and this would never be true, so the verification
would rightfully fail.
The end result is that the out of bounds access at instruction 19 would
be permitted without this fix.
Note that reg->precise is always set to true when user does not have
CAP_BPF (or when subprog count is greater than 1 (i.e. use of any static
or global functions)), hence this is only a problem when precision marks
need to be explicitly propagated (i.e. privileged users with CAP_BPF).
A simplified test case has been included in the next patch to prevent
future regressions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/rtas: Fix RTAS MSR[HV] handling for Cell
The semi-recent changes to MSR handling when entering RTAS (firmware)
cause crashes on IBM Cell machines. An example trace:
kernel tried to execute user page (2fff01a8) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Unable to handle kernel instruction fetch
Faulting instruction address: 0x2fff01a8
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
BE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=4 NUMA Cell
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc2-00433-gede0a8d3307a #207
NIP: 000000002fff01a8 LR: 0000000000032608 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000015236b0 TRAP: 0400 Tainted: G W (6.0.0-rc2-00433-gede0a8d3307a)
MSR: 0000000008001002 <ME,RI> CR: 00000000 XER: 20000000
...
NIP 0x2fff01a8
LR 0x32608
Call Trace:
0xc00000000143c5f8 (unreliable)
.rtas_call+0x224/0x320
.rtas_get_boot_time+0x70/0x150
.read_persistent_clock64+0x114/0x140
.read_persistent_wall_and_boot_offset+0x24/0x80
.timekeeping_init+0x40/0x29c
.start_kernel+0x674/0x8f0
start_here_common+0x1c/0x50
Unlike PAPR platforms where RTAS is only used in guests, on the IBM Cell
machines Linux runs with MSR[HV] set but also uses RTAS, provided by
SLOF.
Fix it by copying the MSR[HV] bit from the MSR value we've just read
using mfmsr into the value used for RTAS.
It seems like we could also fix it using an #ifdef CELL to set MSR[HV],
but that doesn't work because it's possible to build a single kernel
image that runs on both Cell native and pseries. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: fix small mempool leak in SMB2_negotiate()
In some cases of failure (dialect mismatches) in SMB2_negotiate(), after
the request is sent, the checks would return -EIO when they should be
rather setting rc = -EIO and jumping to neg_exit to free the response
buffer from mempool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mceusb: Use new usb_control_msg_*() routines
Automatic kernel fuzzing led to a WARN about invalid pipe direction in
the mceusb driver:
------------[ cut here ]------------
usb 6-1: BOGUS control dir, pipe 80000380 doesn't match bRequestType 40
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2465 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:410
usb_submit_urb+0x1326/0x1820 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:410
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2465 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-00208-g69cb6c6556ad #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0x1326/0x1820 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:410
Code: 7c 24 40 e8 ac 23 91 fd 48 8b 7c 24 40 e8 b2 70 1b ff 45 89 e8
44 89 f1 4c 89 e2 48 89 c6 48 c7 c7 a0 30 a9 86 e8 48 07 11 02 <0f> 0b
e9 1c f0 ff ff e8 7e 23 91 fd 0f b6 1d 63 22 83 05 31 ff 41
RSP: 0018:ffffc900032becf0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881100f3058 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffffc90004961000 RSI: ffff888114c6d580 RDI: fffff52000657d90
RBP: ffff888105ad90f0 R08: ffffffff812c3638 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000005 R11: ffffed1023504ef1 R12: ffff888105ad9000
R13: 0000000000000040 R14: 0000000080000380 R15: ffff88810ba96500
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811a800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffe810bda58 CR3: 000000010b720000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
usb_start_wait_urb+0x101/0x4c0 drivers/usb/core/message.c:58
usb_internal_control_msg drivers/usb/core/message.c:102 [inline]
usb_control_msg+0x31c/0x4a0 drivers/usb/core/message.c:153
mceusb_gen1_init drivers/media/rc/mceusb.c:1431 [inline]
mceusb_dev_probe+0x258e/0x33f0 drivers/media/rc/mceusb.c:1807
The reason for the warning is clear enough; the driver sends an
unusual read request on endpoint 0 but does not set the USB_DIR_IN bit
in the bRequestType field.
More importantly, the whole situation can be avoided and the driver
simplified by converting it over to the relatively new
usb_control_msg_recv() and usb_control_msg_send() routines. That's
what this fix does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: VMX: Do _all_ initialization before exposing /dev/kvm to userspace
Call kvm_init() only after _all_ setup is complete, as kvm_init() exposes
/dev/kvm to userspace and thus allows userspace to create VMs (and call
other ioctls). E.g. KVM will encounter a NULL pointer when attempting to
add a vCPU to the per-CPU loaded_vmcss_on_cpu list if userspace is able to
create a VM before vmx_init() configures said list.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
CPU: 6 PID: 1143 Comm: stable Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7+ #988
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs+0x68/0x230 [kvm_intel]
<TASK>
vmx_vcpu_load+0x16/0x60 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x32/0x1f0 [kvm]
vcpu_load+0x2f/0x40 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_create+0x231/0x310 [kvm]
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x79f/0xe10 [kvm]
? handle_mm_fault+0xb1/0x220
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f5a6b05743b
</TASK>
Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap kvm_intel(+) kvm irqbypass |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix mr leak in RESPST_ERR_RNR
rxe_recheck_mr() will increase mr's ref_cnt, so we should call rxe_put(mr)
to drop mr's ref_cnt in RESPST_ERR_RNR to avoid below warning:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 4156 at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_pool.c:259 __rxe_cleanup+0x1df/0x240 [rdma_rxe]
...
Call Trace:
rxe_dereg_mr+0x4c/0x60 [rdma_rxe]
ib_dereg_mr_user+0xa8/0x200 [ib_core]
ib_mr_pool_destroy+0x77/0xb0 [ib_core]
nvme_rdma_destroy_queue_ib+0x89/0x240 [nvme_rdma]
nvme_rdma_free_queue+0x40/0x50 [nvme_rdma]
nvme_rdma_teardown_io_queues.part.0+0xc3/0x120 [nvme_rdma]
nvme_rdma_error_recovery_work+0x4d/0xf0 [nvme_rdma]
process_one_work+0x582/0xa40
? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x100/0x100
? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x60/0x60
worker_thread+0x2a9/0x700
? process_one_work+0xa40/0xa40
kthread+0x168/0x1a0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: fix WARNING in __ip_vs_cleanup_batch()
During the initialization of ip_vs_conn_net_init(), if file ip_vs_conn
or ip_vs_conn_sync fails to be created, the initialization is successful
by default. Therefore, the ip_vs_conn or ip_vs_conn_sync file doesn't
be found during the remove.
The following is the stack information:
name 'ip_vs_conn_sync'
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 9 at fs/proc/generic.c:712
remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x460
Modules linked in:
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x460
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__ip_vs_cleanup_batch+0x7d/0x120
ops_exit_list+0x125/0x170
cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb00
process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710
worker_thread+0x665/0x1080
kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: fix WARNING in ip_vs_app_net_cleanup()
During the initialization of ip_vs_app_net_init(), if file ip_vs_app
fails to be created, the initialization is successful by default.
Therefore, the ip_vs_app file doesn't be found during the remove in
ip_vs_app_net_cleanup(). It will cause WRNING.
The following is the stack information:
name 'ip_vs_app'
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9 at fs/proc/generic.c:712 remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x460
Modules linked in:
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x460
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ops_exit_list+0x125/0x170
cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb00
process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710
worker_thread+0x665/0x1080
kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mdio: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for __mdiobus_register
Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined, so changing
significant bit to unsigned. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:586:27
left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int'
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa5
dump_stack+0x15/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x4e
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x20c
__mdiobus_register+0x49d/0x4e0
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0xd8/0x12d
do_one_initcall+0x76/0x430
kernel_init_freeable+0x3b3/0x422
kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: piix4: Fix adapter not be removed in piix4_remove()
In piix4_probe(), the piix4 adapter will be registered in:
piix4_probe()
piix4_add_adapters_sb800() / piix4_add_adapter()
i2c_add_adapter()
Based on the probed device type, piix4_add_adapters_sb800() or single
piix4_add_adapter() will be called.
For the former case, piix4_adapter_count is set as the number of adapters,
while for antoher case it is not set and kept default *zero*.
When piix4 is removed, piix4_remove() removes the adapters added in
piix4_probe(), basing on the piix4_adapter_count value.
Because the count is zero for the single adapter case, the adapter won't
be removed and makes the sources allocated for adapter leaked, such as
the i2c client and device.
These sources can still be accessed by i2c or bus and cause problems.
An easily reproduced case is that if a new adapter is registered, i2c
will get the leaked adapter and try to call smbus_algorithm, which was
already freed:
Triggered by: rmmod i2c_piix4 && modprobe max31730
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc053d860
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 3752 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:i2c_default_probe (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:2259) i2c_core
RSP: 0018:ffff888107477710 EFLAGS: 00000246
...
<TASK>
i2c_detect (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:2302) i2c_core
__process_new_driver (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:1336) i2c_core
bus_for_each_dev (drivers/base/bus.c:301)
i2c_for_each_dev (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:1823) i2c_core
i2c_register_driver (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:1861) i2c_core
do_one_initcall (init/main.c:1296)
do_init_module (kernel/module/main.c:2455)
...
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fix this problem by correctly set piix4_adapter_count as 1 for the
single adapter so it can be normally removed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/region: Fix cxl_region leak, cleanup targets at region delete
When a region is deleted any targets that have been previously assigned
to that region hold references to it. Trigger those references to
drop by detaching all targets at unregister_region() time.
Otherwise that region object will leak as userspace has lost the ability
to detach targets once region sysfs is torn down. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: entry: avoid kprobe recursion
The cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() function is called when
handling debug exceptions (and synchronous exceptions from BRK
instructions), and so is called when a probed function executes. If the
compiler does not inline cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler(), it
can be probed.
If cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() is probed, any debug
exception or software breakpoint exception will result in recursive
exceptions leading to a stack overflow. This can be triggered with the
ftrace multiple_probes selftest, and as per the example splat below.
This is a regression caused by commit:
6459b8469753e9fe ("arm64: entry: consolidate Cortex-A76 erratum 1463225 workaround")
... which removed the NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() annotation associated with the
function.
My intent was that cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() would be
inlined into its caller, el1_dbg(), which is marked noinstr and cannot
be probed. Mark cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() as
__always_inline to ensure this.
Example splat prior to this patch (with recursive entries elided):
| # echo p cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
| # echo p do_el0_svc >> /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/enable
| Insufficient stack space to handle exception!
| ESR: 0x0000000096000047 -- DABT (current EL)
| FAR: 0xffff800009cefff0
| Task stack: [0xffff800009cf0000..0xffff800009cf4000]
| IRQ stack: [0xffff800008000000..0xffff800008004000]
| Overflow stack: [0xffff00007fbc00f0..0xffff00007fbc10f0]
| CPU: 0 PID: 145 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.0.0 #2
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 604003c5 (nZCv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : arm64_enter_el1_dbg+0x4/0x20
| lr : el1_dbg+0x24/0x5c
| sp : ffff800009cf0000
| x29: ffff800009cf0000 x28: ffff000002c74740 x27: 0000000000000000
| x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
| x23: 00000000604003c5 x22: ffff80000801745c x21: 0000aaaac95ac068
| x20: 00000000f2000004 x19: ffff800009cf0040 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
| x11: 0000000000000010 x10: ffff800008c87190 x9 : ffff800008ca00d0
| x8 : 000000000000003c x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
| x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00000000000043a4
| x2 : 00000000f2000004 x1 : 00000000f2000004 x0 : ffff800009cf0040
| Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow
| CPU: 0 PID: 145 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.0.0 #2
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0xe4/0x104
| show_stack+0x18/0x4c
| dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c
| dump_stack+0x18/0x38
| panic+0x14c/0x338
| test_taint+0x0/0x2c
| panic_bad_stack+0x104/0x118
| handle_bad_stack+0x34/0x48
| __bad_stack+0x78/0x7c
| arm64_enter_el1_dbg+0x4/0x20
| el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
| el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
| cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34
...
| el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
| el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
| cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34
...
| el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
| el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
| cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34
| el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
| el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
| do_el0_svc+0x0/0x28
| el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0
| el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190
| Kernel Offset: disabled
| CPU features: 0x0080,00005021,19001080
| Memory Limit: none
| ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow ]---
With this patch, cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() is inlined
into el1_dbg(), and el1_dbg() cannot be probed:
| # echo p cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
| sh: write error: No such file or directory
| # grep -w cortex_a76_errat
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix BUG_ON() when directory entry has invalid rec_len
The rec_len field in the directory entry has to be a multiple of 4. A
corrupted filesystem image can be used to hit a BUG() in
ext4_rec_len_to_disk(), called from make_indexed_dir().
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/ext4.h:2413!
...
RIP: 0010:make_indexed_dir+0x53f/0x5f0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? add_dirent_to_buf+0x1b2/0x200
ext4_add_entry+0x36e/0x480
ext4_add_nondir+0x2b/0xc0
ext4_create+0x163/0x200
path_openat+0x635/0xe90
do_filp_open+0xb4/0x160
? __create_object.isra.0+0x1de/0x3b0
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x12/0x30
do_sys_openat2+0x91/0x150
__x64_sys_open+0x6c/0xa0
do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
The fix simply adds a call to ext4_check_dir_entry() to validate the
directory entry, returning -EFSCORRUPTED if the entry is invalid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix the sk->sk_forward_alloc warning of sk_stream_kill_queues
When running `test_sockmap` selftests, the following warning appears:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 197 at net/core/stream.c:205 sk_stream_kill_queues+0xd3/0xf0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x55/0x110
tcp_rcv_state_process+0xd28/0x1380
? tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77/0x2c0
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77/0x2c0
__release_sock+0x106/0x130
__tcp_close+0x1a7/0x4e0
tcp_close+0x20/0x70
inet_release+0x3c/0x80
__sock_release+0x3a/0xb0
sock_close+0x14/0x20
__fput+0xa3/0x260
task_work_run+0x59/0xb0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1b3/0x1c0
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The root case is in commit 84472b436e76 ("bpf, sockmap: Fix more uncharged
while msg has more_data"), where I used msg->sg.size to replace the tosend,
causing breakage:
if (msg->apply_bytes && msg->apply_bytes < tosend)
tosend = psock->apply_bytes; |
