| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Chamilo LMS is an open-source learning management system. From 2.0.0 until 2.0.1, `GET /user/{username}` is anonymously reachable and renders six user-editable profile fields (`firstname`, `lastname`, `competences`, `openarea`, `teach`, and `diplomas`) inside `{% autoescape false %}`, without server-side sanitization on the write path. A ROLE_STUDENT attacker can plant HTML in their own profile; self-registration, when enabled, lets an otherwise anonymous attacker obtain that role. The stored content executes in the browser of any visitor, including administrators, who follows the public profile link, potentially allowing account takeover through session, JWT, or `localStorage` exfiltration. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.1. |
| Use after free in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.79 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| A flaw was found in the OpenShift Cloud Credential Operator Mint-mode IAM policies for AWS. Operator credentials are provisioned with account-wide scope for destructive actions rather than being restricted to cluster-owned resources, enabling cross-scope impact after credential compromise. |
| Zuke is a code-first, strongly typed build automation system for Deno. Prior to 1.51.0, the @zuke/core MCP registry mode accepts command-form registry descriptors without applying the ZUKE_REGISTRY_LAUNCH_HOSTS authorization enforced for remote module descriptors. When zuke mcp --registry --allow-run reads a registry writable by another party and a run-capable caller invokes the affected tool, the registry writer can choose the program and arguments executed with the operator's environment and workspace access. The --allow-run and --protect name globs do not contain the issue because the descriptor supplies those names, and the optional destructive confirmation displays a description controlled by the same writer. The local default registry populated only through zuke register is not affected because that command writes module-form descriptors. This issue is fixed in version 1.51.0. |
| Use after free in FileSystem in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.79 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.4.4 and 10.2.8, a user who does not hold the "admin" or "power" Splunk roles could derive the PostgreSQL sidecar database superuser password and run arbitrary operating system commands as the user account running Splunk Enterprise on search head cluster members.
The vulnerability is possible because the PostgreSQL sidecar service derives a privileged database password from the search head cluster identifier that appears in search job logs.
For more information see About configuring role-based user access (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/manage-users-and-security/10.2/manage-splunk-platform-users-and-roles/about-configuring-role-based-user-access), server.conf (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/admin-manual/10.2/configuration-file-reference/10.2.0-configuration-file-reference/server.conf), and Sidecar configuration settings (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/admin-manual/10.4/splunk-sidecars/sidecar-configuration-settings) in the Splunk documentation. |
| Use-after-free in the Layout: Text and Fonts component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 159, Firefox ESR 115.44, Firefox ESR 153.6, Thunderbird 159, and Thunderbird 153.6. |
| A trust-boundary flaw in CRI-O's sandbox state persistence allows attacker-influenced pod metadata to overwrite CRI-O's own reserved sandbox bookkeeping; once reloaded as trusted after a restart, a later container recreate in that sandbox can expose a host-side runtime-management resource inside the container, enabling container escape. |
| External control of file name or path and uncontrolled resource consumption in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers who can reach the builtin service port to create directories and truncate/overwrite files with the privileges of the server process, or to hold the process-wide CPU/contention profiler for an arbitrarily long time.
Root Cause:
1. The builtin /flags service allows gflags carrying a validator to be modified at runtime via ?setvalue=. The bvar/mbvar dump path gflags (bvar_dump_file, bvar_dump_tabs, mbvar_dump_file) were registered with an accept-anything validator whose only purpose was to wake the dumping thread. A remote attacker could therefore repoint the dump path (e.g. GET /flags/bvar_dump_file?setvalue=/victim/dir/target followed by GET /flags/bvar_dump?setvalue=true, or the equivalent for mbvar_dump_file, which is used verbatim without a forced suffix), making the dumping thread recursively create directories and open/truncate files at attacker-chosen locations. Tab names in bvar_dump_tabs were appended to the path without sanitization, allowing '..' to escape the configured directory.
2. The /pprof builtin service did not clamp the ?seconds= parameter to FLAGS_max_profiling_seconds (a limit that /hotspots enforced). A single request such as ?seconds=2147483647 made the handler sleep for decades while holding the process-wide gperftools CPU profiler or bthread contention profiler, so /hotspots/cpu and /hotspots/contention returned 503 for everyone else during that time.
Affected Scenarios:
Any Apache bRPC server exposing the builtin services (enabled by default on the same port as normal RPC traffic) to untrusted networks.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3523
Note:
After the fix, bvar_dump_file, bvar_dump_tabs and mbvar_dump_file can no longer be modified at runtime through the /flags builtin service. They can still be changed programmatically via google::SetCommandLineOption(), taking effect on the next dump cycle. The profiling duration of /pprof is now capped by the -max_profiling_seconds gflag (default 300 seconds), which can be adjusted by the server owner. |
| Inconsistent interpretation of HTTP requests (HTTP request/response smuggling) in the bundled HTTP/1.1 parser of Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to smuggle requests and inject headers when bRPC is deployed behind a proxy or load balancer that parses the same bytes differently.
Root Cause:
The bRPC fork of http-parser accepts and acts on several HTTP/1.1 header forms that a conforming front-end either rejects or interprets differently, so the framing or the header set of a message can differ between the front-end and bRPC:
1. A space before the colon of framing headers (e.g. Content-Length : 5) is accepted; the value still drives bRPC's framing while the reported field name contains the trailing space.
2. Interior spaces inside a Content-Length value (e.g. Content-Length: 1 3) are skipped, so bRPC reads 13 where a front-end reads 1 or rejects the message (same class as CVE-2022-32213 in Node.js).
3. Obsolete line folding (obs-fold, RFC 7230 3.2.4) of Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding values is accepted, so a folded framing value drives bRPC's framing while a front-end that does not unfold sees a different message.
4. Chunked trailer fields are fed to the same header callbacks as the header section and are merged into the header map like real headers. A front-end only inspects the header section, so any chunked request can smuggle fields such as Authorization or X-Forwarded-For past it.
5. Transfer-Encoding lists with optional whitespace after a comma (e.g. Transfer-Encoding: gzip, chunked) are not recognized as chunked: such requests are rejected, and responses are read until connection close instead of as chunked, causing response desync.
Affected Scenarios:
bRPC server or client communicating over HTTP/1.1 with a front proxy, load balancer, or any peer that parses the message independently. An attacker able to send requests through the front-end can desynchronize the two parsers to smuggle requests, forge headers (e.g. Authorization, X-Forwarded-For) via chunked trailers, or desynchronize responses.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3521
Note:
After applying the fix, the four header forms above are rejected by default and chunked trailers are dropped instead of merged into the header map. Two gflags are provided for compatibility: http_allow_obs_fold=true restores acceptance of folded Content-Length/Transfer-Encoding values, and http_strict_header_token=true additionally rejects spaces inside any header field name (not only the ones that decide framing). Legitimate clients that do not use these obsolete forms are unaffected. |
| Improper authorization in Apache bRPC (versions < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to access builtin services through the public port.
Root Cause:
ServerOptions.internal_port is documented to make builtin services (and Tabbed services) reachable only from the internal port, and the HTTP/h2 dispatch path enforced this. However, all protobuf-based protocol dispatch paths (baidu_std, hulu_pbrpc, sofa_pbrpc, and the nshead-based protocols public_pbrpc, nshead_mcpack, nova_pbrpc and ubrpc2pb) computed the security_mode flag but never enforced it between method resolution and method invocation. Since builtin services share the method map with user services, a client able to reach the public port could invoke builtin services such as brpc.vars or hotspots by name over these pb protocols and disclose sensitive runtime information (metrics, flags, profiler data) that the operator intended to expose only via the internal port.
Affected Scenarios:
Use a bRPC server with ServerOptions.internal_port configured (or with builtin/Tabbed services otherwise expected to be gated by it) while the public port is reachable from an untrusted network and any pb-based protocol is enabled.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3511 |
| Interpretation conflict in the HTTP protocol implementation in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to bypass access control rules enforced by a front proxy.
Root Cause:
The method dispatch function FindMethodPropertyByURI() in bRPC's HTTP protocol splits the request path with a string splitter that skips empty fields, so paths containing empty path segments (consecutive slashes), such as //flags, /flags// and /flags//port, are dispatched to the same method as their collapsed form /flags. Per RFC 3986 these are distinct paths. A front proxy that enforces an ACL (e.g. blocking access to builtin services such as /flags) matches the collapsed form only, and therefore forwards the padded literal to the bRPC server, where it is dispatched as if it were the collapsed form. This differential allows //flags?setvalue= to reach a builtin service that /flags is not allowed to reach. Additionally, the HTTP/2 implementation never validated the :path pseudo-header, so requests without a :path, or with a :path that neither begins with '/' nor is the asterisk-form '*', contrary to RFC 9113 section 8.3.1, were not rejected.
Affected Scenarios:
Deployments of Apache bRPC behind a front proxy or gateway that performs access control (ACL) decisions on the literal request path, where the bRPC server accepts HTTP or HTTP/2 traffic from that proxy. In such deployments an attacker can send a path containing empty path segments to reach a resource that the front proxy intended to block.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3512
Note:
After applying the fix, HTTP and HTTP/2 request paths containing empty path segments (consecutive slashes) are rejected by default, and HTTP/2 :path values that are empty or neither begin with '/' nor equal '*' are rejected. Deployments that depend on the previous lenient behavior can restore it by turning on the gflag -http_allow_empty_path_segments, which is not recommended for servers exposed to untrusted traffic. |
| A data race in the RDMA transport of Apache bRPC (versions < 1.18.0) allows a remote client to crash the server process (denial of service) when RDMA is enabled at build time and runtime.
Root Cause:
When a bRPC server negotiates RDMA with a client, the handshake completes on the TCP fd, but the server kept parsing that fd afterwards as if it were still an RPC channel. The TCP-fd input stream and the RDMA QP input stream (driven by CQ events) shared the same Socket::_read_buf, preferred_index and parsing_context without synchronization. In addition, CQ event processing could start while the handshake parsing was still in progress, and the handshake ACK phase could consume bytes belonging to the next protocol. A remote, unauthenticated client that has completed the RDMA handshake can send data on the TCP fd at the same time RDMA messages are being processed, corrupting the shared input buffer and parser state and crashing the server process (CWE-362, availability impact).
Affected Scenarios:
Use a bRPC server with RDMA support enabled (built with BRPC_WITH_RDMA and serving rdma:// / SOCKET_MODE_RDMA sockets) and accept connections from untrusted clients. Deployments without RDMA are not affected.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3505 |
| A reachable assertion in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows a malicious remote peer to crash the process, resulting in denial of service.
Root Cause:
When a Socket with health checking enabled fails, Socket::WaitAndReset closes its file descriptor while the event dispatcher may still be delivering an input event (EPOLLIN/EVFILT_READ) that was fetched for the just-closed fd. If the health check then succeeds and revives the Socket, Socket::Address succeeds again while the fd is still -1 (the next write reconnects on demand). In that window, Socket::OnInputEvent hits CHECK(!(events & EPOLLIN)) (or the kqueue equivalent) because the Socket is addressable but has no fd. CHECK failures terminate the process when bRPC is built with glog or when the gflag -crash_on_fatal_log is enabled (CHECK always terminates in OFFICIAL_BUILD/NDEBUG builds as well).
Affected Scenarios:
Applications using bRPC clients with health check enabled (-health_check_interval). A malicious remote peer that the client connects to can deliberately abort connections and immediately accept the health check probes, racing connection teardown against health check revival to trigger the assertion and abort the process.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3510
Note:
After applying the fix, stale input events on a Socket revived without an fd are silently dropped instead of triggering the assertion. No user-visible interface or wire protocol is changed. |
| A Thrift client in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0, built with WITH_THRIFT which is off by default) can be crashed by the server peer it talks to. When the server returns a T_EXCEPTION reply whose exception struct is malformed, the client decodes it without catching what Apache Thrift throws (TProtocolException, TTransportException or std::length_error). The exception unwinds out of the bthread task function and the process calls std::terminate(), terminating the whole process along with every other in-flight RPC.
This is the client response path, so the adversary is the server peer, which THREAT_MODEL.md treats as untrusted. It requires a WITH_THRIFT build (off by default).
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3500 |
| Enforceable assertion in the streaming feature of Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows a remote attacker to crash the server process by sending a malformed stream feedback frame.
Root Cause:
When handling FRAME_TYPE_FEEDBACK frames, bRPC calls Stream::SetRemoteConsumed() which contains CHECK(_cur_buf_size > 0) and unconditionally asserts CHECK(buf.IsEmpty()) on the frame payload. A feedback frame that carries an unexpected payload, or a feedback frame received on a stream where flow control is disabled (cur_buf_size == 0), reaches these assertions. On failure, CHECK failures abort the process, allowing an unauthenticated single client (once a stream is established) to terminate the server and cause a denial of service.
Affected Scenarios:
Use bRPC server with the streaming control feature (Stream API) served from untrusted network.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3494
The fix rejects malformed feedback frames with EPROTO and closes only the affected stream instead of crashing the whole process, and it bounds buffer shrinking so cur_buf_size never drops to 0 while flow control is enabled. |
| Uncontrolled resource consumption in the streaming RPC component of Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) allows a remote attacker to exhaust server memory and cause denial of service by sending a single RPC request that declares an excessive number of streams.
Root Cause:
In the streaming RPC feature, a client can declare multiple streams in one RPC request by putting extra stream identifiers into the repeated field `stream_settings.extra_stream_ids` of the RPC meta. On the server side, `StreamAccept` creates one response stream for every stream identifier declared by the request, without limiting the number of streams accepted in a single RPC. The request body size is only bounded by `max_body_size` (default 64MB), which is enough to carry millions of stream identifiers. Each accepted stream allocates its own bthread execution queue and associated resources, so a single crafted request can make the server create a huge number of streams and exhaust memory, leading to denial of service.
Affected Scenarios:
Use a bRPC server that serves streaming RPC and calls `StreamAccept` to accept streams from untrusted clients.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to the 1.18.0 version.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3493
Note:
The fix adds a new gflag `stream_max_streams_per_request` with a default value of 64. Requests declaring more streams than the limit are rejected before any response stream is created. Applications that legitimately need to accept more than 64 streams in one RPC must raise this flag; otherwise such requests will fail after applying the fix. |
| Unbounded memory accumulation in the stream message reassembly path of Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to exhaust the memory of a server (denial of service) by sending an endless sequence of continuation data frames.
Root Cause:
The streaming RPC protocol bounds every single data frame by max_body_size, but a fragmented stream message accumulates continuation frames into one buffer (_pending_buf) without any limit on the accumulated size. A malicious peer that can open a stream can therefore keep sending continuation frames to make the receiver accumulate an arbitrarily large in-memory message. Since the default flow-control settings (socket_max_streams_unconsumed_bytes=0) do not throttle the sending rate, the receiver's memory grows until the process runs out of memory and crashes or becomes unavailable.
Affected Scenarios:
Services that accept streams from untrusted clients (for example using brpc::StreamAccept or brpc::StreamCreate with the built-in streaming protocol) are affected.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3489
Note:
The fix limits the accumulated payload of a fragmented stream message to max_body_size (default 64MB). When the accumulated payload exceeds the limit, the pending fragments are released and the stream is closed with error EMSGSIZE. After applying the fix, legitimate fragmented stream messages larger than max_body_size will be rejected; you can adjust the gflag max_body_size to change the limit. |
| Out-of-bounds reads in URL parsing and case-insensitive header lookup in Apache bRPC before version 1.18.0 on platforms where plain char is unsigned, such as ARM64, allow remote attackers to cause a process crash and denial of service by sending crafted input containing bytes with the high bit set.
Root Cause:
Two 256-entry lookup tables are accessed through pointers biased by 128 so that valid indices are in the range -128 to 127. Input bytes are promoted from plain char to int without first normalizing them to the signed-char range. On affected platforms, bytes in the range 0x80 to 0xFF therefore become indices 128 to 255 and read up to 127 bytes beyond the end of the underlying tables.
Affected Scenarios:
A remotely accessible bRPC HTTP server on an affected platform can reach the vulnerable URL lookup through an unauthenticated request URI containing a high-bit byte. The case-insensitive lookup is also reachable when untrusted header names are processed through APIs such as the HTTP/2 HPACK path. HTTP/1 header names containing high-bit bytes are rejected by the HTTP/1 parser before reaching the vulnerable lookup. Builds where plain char is signed, which commonly include x86_64 builds, are not affected by this issue.
How to Fix:
Choose one of the following options:
1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to version 1.18.0 or later.
2. Apply the patch from https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3376 .
The fix normalizes lookup-table indices to the signed-char range before accessing the biased tables. |
| XDG Desktop Portal is a desktop integration portal. Prior to version 1.22.1, malicious sandboxed applications can use the FileChooser.SaveFiles method to gain arbitrary file access to non-existing files on the host (limited to files the user has access to). The FileChooser.SaveFiles method takes optional filenames which get appended to the selected directory by backends. The backends are supposed to check that the file does not exist yet. The filenames are not validated by the frontend and also not by common backends. This issue has been patched in version 1.22.1. |
