| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Protect the type name while describing a key
keyctl_describe_key() must keep the key type's name alive until
kasprintf() has consumed it. The retained key reference keeps the key
and its description alive, but does not pin the module providing its
type. The name is passed to kasprintf() without holding key->sem.
kvasprintf() uses the saved name pointer in two formatting passes, with
a GFP_KERNEL allocation between them. With AF_RXRPC=m, a task that
passes View permission before type retirement can overlap a privileged
module unload in this order:
1. KEYCTL_DESCRIBE looks up the key, saves key->type->name in the
kasprintf() arguments and completes the first formatting pass.
2. While the formatter is delayed before its second pass,
af_rxrpc_exit() calls unregister_key_type(), which removes the type
from the registry and waits for key_gc_keytype().
3. The collector takes key->sem for writing, retypes the retained key
to key_type_dead and completes retirement. Unregistration and module
exit return, allowing free_module() to release the type and name.
4. The formatter resumes its second pass and reads the saved name from
released module storage, which can fault in string().
Hold key->sem for reading across kasprintf(). The collector then cannot
retype the key or complete retirement until both formatting passes have
finished. If retirement wins the lock first, formatting uses the core
key_type_dead name instead. Release the semaphore immediately after
kasprintf(), including on allocation failure, before copying to
userspace.
Oops report as below:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8054794
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
RIP: 0010:string+0x23f/0x470
Call Trace:
vsnprintf+0x330/0x1110 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses
KEYCTL_READ returns the serial numbers in a keyring in associative-array
traversal order. The first word of the index is a public, deterministic
hash of the type pointer, domain pointer and description. An unprivileged
user can therefore insert keys with known descriptions, predict their
order for each possible KASLR slide, and recover the kernel image address.
On an x86-64 build with 16 MiB alignment, 45 user keys suffice to
distinguish the candidate slides.
Remove the addresses from the whole index, not just its first hash word.
Assign each key type and domain a nonzero 64-bit ID and hash those IDs and
the description with a once-initialized SipHash key. Use the full IDs in
the later index chunks as well. Truncating or hashing the IDs there would
lose the guarantee that distinct type/domain/description tuples have a
differing index bit.
Allocate IDs lazily since private key types need not be registered. Cache
them in the index key so tree walks and copies of an existing index do not
need to dereference a type descriptor that may have been unregistered.
Keep the 32-bit chunk layout and diff_objects() bit offsets consistent,
and retain the separate root slot for keyrings used by recursive search.
The key comparison, permissions and userspace data format are unchanged;
only the address-dependent in-memory ordering is replaced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Protect the read method check against type removal
keyctl_read_key() checks key->type->read without holding key->sem.
A reference keeps the key alive, but does not pin the module containing
its type. A surviving RxRPC key can therefore be read while AF_RXRPC
is being unloaded:
KEYCTL_READ task Module unload and key GC
---------------- ------------------------
lookup_user_key()
permission / possession checks
load key->type
af_rxrpc_exit()
unregister_key_type()
GC: down_write(key->sem)
GC: retype to key_type_dead
GC: up_write(key->sem)
unregister_key_type() returns
free_module()
read saved type's read member
The final access can read freed module storage. The read invocation in
__keyctl_read_key() is already protected by key->sem, but the earlier
method check is outside that critical section.
Move the method check into __keyctl_read_key(), after key_validate() and
under its existing read hold on key->sem. The check and invocation then
use the same protected type for length queries and every read retry.
The GC cannot retype the key until the semaphore is released, and type
unregistration waits for that GC pass before the module can be freed.
Return -EOPNOTSUPP when validation succeeds and the type has no read
method. A temporary buffer may now be allocated before this result;
allocation and copying to userspace remain outside the semaphore. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys/trusted_keys: return immediately after TPM unseal failure
trusted_tpm_unseal() proceeds to pcrlock() when the TPM unseal operation
fails. If pcrlock() succeeds, its return value overwrites the unseal error,
causing key instantiation to succeed.
Return immediately when unseal fails to preserve the original error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
asymmetric_keys: reject trust keys without IDs
The PKCS#8 parser deliberately leaves the asym_key_ids payload slot
empty. key_or_keyring_common() unconditionally dereferences that slot
when a PKCS#8 key is supplied to a key_or_keyring restriction. Both the
plain and :chain forms reach this branch, allowing an unprivileged caller
to trigger a NULL pointer dereference through KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
followed by add_key().
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:key_or_keyring_common (crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:205 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:279)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:884)
key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:1021)
__do_sys_add_key (security/keys/keyctl.c:134)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Reject an asymmetric restriction key without key IDs. A PKCS#8 private
key cannot identify the signer of a candidate certificate and is not a
valid trust anchor. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Initialize modname and offset in print_rec()
print_rec() leaves 'modname' and 'offset' uninitialized and
kallsyms_lookup() only sets them on success. When the lookup fails like
when a module is being loaded or unloaded, 'modname' holds a garbage
value, passes the 'if (modname)' check, and is dereferenced by
seq_printf().
Oops: general protection fault
RIP: 0010:string+0x48/0xe0
Call Trace:
vsnprintf+0x1f5/0x650
seq_printf+0x8e/0xb0
print_rec+0x6c/0xc0
t_show+0x4c/0x440
seq_read_iter+0x119/0x480
This can be triggered by reading available_filter_functions while a
module is being loaded or unloaded.
Initialize both variables so a failed lookup skips the module name. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coredump: hold RCU while releasing parked threads
coredump_finish() releases the parked threads by clearing ->task in
their core_thread entry and calling wake_up_process() on each of them.
It does that without holding a reference on the task and without being
inside rcu.
But calling wake_up_process(task) without rcu here isn't safe. A parked
thread doesn't need that wakeup to leave. A spurious wakeup or a
preemption after the store is enough for the task to go away.
So if the coredump client is preempted between the store and
wake_up_process() the thread can exit and be freed in the meantime and
try_to_wake_up() takes pi_lock in freed memory.
Hold rcu across the loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fork: release the files of a failed fork after sched_cancel_fork()
Reorder copy_process() cleanup so sched_fork() taking scx_fork_rwsem
scx_pre_fork() is safe and isn't held around exiting files. Right now, a
fork that fails while another thread closed the bpf link fd will
deadlock against its own read side. It also blocks every fork on the
system:
copy_process() holds scx_fork_rwsem for read
exit_files()
close_files()
filp_close_sync()
bpf_scx_unreg()
kthread_flush_work() waits for the disable work
scx_root_disable()
percpu_down_write(&scx_fork_rwsem)
Simply release the child's files after sched_cancel_fork() dropped the
lock. The task starts out as a copy of its parent so p->files points to
the parent's table until copy_files() replaces it. exit_files() must not
run for a fork that failed before that. Clear p->files up front so
exit_files() is a no-op for those and make copy_files() set it
explicitly for CLONE_FILES. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.19.0, a crafted PDF can provide unusually large alphabetical page-label values that cause pypdf/_page_labels.py to generate strings beyond a reasonable page-label length when an application retrieves document page labels, consuming excessive memory and potentially making the application unavailable. This issue is fixed in version 6.19.0. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to version 6.6.0, pypdf has possible long runtimes for malformed startxref. An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to possibly long runtimes for invalid startxref entries. When rebuilding the cross-reference table, PDF files with lots of whitespace characters become problematic. Only the non-strict reading mode is affected. Only the non-strict reading mode is affected. This issue has been patched in version 6.6.0. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.7.1, an attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to an infinite loop. This requires accessing the children of a TreeObject, for example as part of outlines. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.7.1. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.7.1, an attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes and large memory consumption. This requires parsing the /ToUnicode entry of a font with unusually large values, for example during text extraction. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.7.1. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.7.1, an attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes. This requires a malformed /FlateDecode stream, where the byte-by-byte decompression is used. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.7.1. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to version 6.7.5, an attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes. This requires accessing a stream which uses the /ASCIIHexDecode filter. This issue has been patched in version 6.7.5. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. An attacker who uses a vulnerability present in versions prior to 6.10.2 can craft a PDF which leads to the RAM being exhausted. This requires accessing an image using `/FlateDecode` with large size values. This has been fixed in pypdf 6.10.2. As a workaround, one may apply the changes from the patch manually. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.12.2, an attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to large memory usage. This requires extracting the text of a page which contains a form XObject with self-references. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.12.2. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.13.0, an attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to an infinite loop. This requires extracting the text in layout mode. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.13.0. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.13.0, an attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to an infinite loop. This requires merging a file with outlines into a writer. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.13.0. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.13.3, a maliciously crafted PDF can cause DoS. An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to large memory usage, as MAX_DECLARED_STREAM_LENGTH is sometimes ignored. This requires parsing a content stream without a /Length value. This issue has been fixed in version 6.13.3. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.14.1, an attacker can craft a PDF with a page content stream containing a not terminated inline image, causing an infinite loop during inline image end marker detection such as when extracting page text. This issue is fixed in version 6.14.1. |
