| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: OOB read regression in smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE-walk loops
Commit d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in
smb_check_perm_dacl()") introduced a transposed bounds check:
if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + aces_size < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)
Since offsetof(..sid) is 8 and CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE is 8, this evaluates
to `aces_size < 0`. Because `aces_size` is always non-negative, this
check becomes dead code and never breaks the loop.
Worse, that commit removed the old 4-byte guard, meaning the loop now
reads `ace->size` (offset 2) even when `aces_size` is 0-3 bytes. This
re-opens a 2-byte heap out-of-bounds (OOB) read past the pntsd allocation
during subsequent SMB2_CREATE operations.
Fix this by properly transposing the comparison to require at least
16 bytes (8-byte offset + 8-byte SID base), matching the correct form
used in smb_inherit_dacl(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: reset runtime state when cloning SAs
iptfs_clone_state() clones the IPTFS mode data with kmemdup(). This
copies runtime objects which must not be shared with the original SA,
including the embedded sk_buff_head, hrtimers, spinlock, and in-flight
reassembly/reorder state.
If xfrm_state_migrate() fails after clone_state() but before the later
init_state() call has reinitialized those fields, the cloned state can be
destroyed by xfrm_state_gc_task() with list and timer state copied from the
original SA. With queued packets this lets the clone splice and free skbs
owned by the original IPTFS queue, leading to use-after-free and
double-free reports in iptfs_destroy_state() and skb release paths.
Reinitialize the clone's runtime state before publishing it through
x->mode_data. Because clone_state() now publishes a destroyable mode_data
object before init_state(), take the mode callback module reference there.
Avoid taking it again from __iptfs_init_state() for the same object. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: chemical: mhz19b: reject oversized serial replies
mhz19b_receive_buf() appends each serdev chunk into the fixed
MHZ19B_CMD_SIZE receive buffer and advances buf_idx by len without
checking that the chunk fits in the remaining space. A large callback
can therefore overflow st->buf before the command path validates the
reply.
Reset the reply state before each command and reject oversized serial
replies before copying them into the fixed buffer. When an oversized
reply is detected, wake the waiter and report -EMSGSIZE instead of
overwriting st->buf. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gyro: itg3200: fix i2c read into the wrong stack location
itg3200_read_all_channels() takes `__be16 *buf' as a parameter and
fills the i2c_msg destination as `(char *)&buf'. Since `buf' is the
parameter (a pointer), `&buf' is the address of the local pointer
slot on the stack of itg3200_read_all_channels(), not the address
of the caller's scan buffer. The (char *) cast hides the type
mismatch.
i2c_transfer() therefore writes ITG3200_SCAN_ELEMENTS * sizeof(s16)
= 8 bytes into the parameter's stack slot, which is discarded when
the function returns. The caller's scan buffer in
itg3200_trigger_handler() is never written to, so
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() pushes uninitialised stack
contents to userspace via /dev/iio:deviceX every scan -- both a
functional bug (no actual gyroscope or temperature data is
delivered through the triggered buffer) and an information leak.
The non-buffered read_raw() path is unaffected: it goes through
itg3200_read_reg_s16() which uses `&out' on a local s16 value,
where that is correct.
Drop the spurious `&' so the i2c read writes into the caller's
buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: xpad - fix out-of-bounds access for Share button
xpadone_process_packet() receives len directly from urb->actual_length
and uses it to index the share-button byte at data[len - 18] or
data[len - 26]. Since both len and data[0] are under the device's
control, a broken controller can send a GIP_CMD_INPUT packet with
actual_length < 18 (e.g. 5 bytes) and reach this code path, causing
accesses beyond the actual array.
Fix this by calculating the offset and checking bounds against the
packet length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
auxdisplay: line-display: fix OOB read on zero-length message_store()
linedisp_display() unconditionally reads msg[count - 1] before
checking whether count is zero, so a write of zero bytes to the
message sysfs attribute hits msg[-1]:
write(fd, "", 0);
-> message_store(..., buf, count=0)
-> linedisp_display(linedisp, buf, count=0)
-> msg[count - 1] == '\n' ; OOB read
The kernfs write buffer for that store is a 1-byte allocation
(kernfs_fop_write_iter() does kmalloc(len + 1) with len == 0),
so msg[-1] is a 1-byte read before the slab object. On a
KASAN-enabled kernel this trips an out-of-bounds report and
panics; on stock kernels it silently reads adjacent slab data
and, if that byte happens to be '\n', the following count--
wraps ssize_t 0 to -1 and is then passed to kmemdup_nul().
linedisp_display() is reached from the message_store() sysfs
callback (drivers/auxdisplay/line-display.c message attribute,
mode 0644) and from the in-tree initial-message setup with
count == -1, so the OOB path is only userspace-triggerable via
zero-byte writes; vfs_write() does not short-circuit on
count == 0 and kernfs_fop_write_iter() dispatches the store
callback regardless.
Guard the trailing-newline trim with a count check. The
existing if (!count) block then takes the clear-display path
unchanged.
Affects every auxdisplay driver that registers via
linedisp_register() / linedisp_attach(): ht16k33, max6959,
img-ascii-lcd, seg-led-gpio. |
| Improper restriction of rendered ui layers or frames in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network. |
| libosmocore through 1.14.1 contains an out-of-bounds read in iuup_rx_initialization() in src/gsm/iuup.c. This allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information. |
| Buffer over-read in Servicing Stack Updates allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Windows Client-Side Caching (CSC) Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/mm: Add missing secure storage access fixups for donated memory
There are special cases where secure storage access exceptions happen
in a kernel context for pages that don't have the PG_arch_1 bit
set. That bit is set for non-exported guest secure storage (memory)
but is absent on storage donated to the Ultravisor since the kernel
isn't allowed to export donated pages.
Prior to this patch we would try to export the page by calling
arch_make_folio_accessible() which would instantly return since the
arch bit is absent signifying that the page was already exported and
no further action is necessary. This leads to secure storage access
exception loops which can never be resolved.
With this patch we unconditionally try to export and if that fails we
fixup. |
| Imager::File::GIF versions before 1.006 for Perl allow out-of-bounds reads when consolidating GIF images.
With `gif_consolidate => 1`, palette indices from the image are used without checking the colour table's bounds. The i_readgif_low routine reads beyond the heap allocation and copies the bytes into output pixels. The default GIF reader is not affected.
The same code ships bundled in the Imager distribution.
An attacker supplying a crafted GIF can disclose adjacent heap memory through the decoded output and may crash the process. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb3: fix for slab out of bounds on mount to ksmbd
With KASAN enabled, it is possible to get a slab out of bounds
during mount to ksmbd due to missing check in parse_server_interfaces()
(see below):
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in
parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881433dba98 by task mount/9827
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 9827 Comm: mount Tainted: G
OE 6.16.0-rc2-kasan #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision Tower 3620/0MWYPT,
BIOS 2.13.1 06/14/2019
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x9f/0xf0
print_report+0xd1/0x670
__virt_addr_valid+0x22c/0x430
? parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs]
? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x2a/0x1f0
? parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs]
kasan_report+0xd6/0x110
parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs]
__asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x13/0x20
parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs]
? __pfx_parse_server_interfaces+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x51/0x60
SMB3_request_interfaces+0x1ad/0x3f0 [cifs]
? __pfx_SMB3_request_interfaces+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? SMB2_tcon+0x23c/0x15d0 [cifs]
smb3_qfs_tcon+0x173/0x2b0 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb3_qfs_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? cifs_get_tcon+0x105d/0x2120 [cifs]
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x5d/0x200
? cifs_get_tcon+0x105d/0x2120 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb3_qfs_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
cifs_mount_get_tcon+0x369/0xb90 [cifs]
? dfs_cache_find+0xe7/0x150 [cifs]
dfs_mount_share+0x985/0x2970 [cifs]
? check_path.constprop.0+0x28/0x50
? save_trace+0x54/0x370
? __pfx_dfs_mount_share+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? __lock_acquire+0xb82/0x2ba0
? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
cifs_mount+0xbc/0x9e0 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x5d/0x200
? cifs_setup_cifs_sb+0x29d/0x810 [cifs]
cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x263/0x1990 [cifs] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: fix potential 32-bit overflow when accessing ARRAY map element
If BPF array map is bigger than 4GB, element pointer calculation can
overflow because both index and elem_size are u32. Fix this everywhere
by forcing 64-bit multiplication. Extract this formula into separate
small helper and use it consistently in various places.
Speculative-preventing formula utilizing index_mask trick is left as is,
but explicit u64 casts are added in both places. |
| Immutable.js provides many Persistent Immutable data structures. Prior to versions 3.8.3, 4.3.7, and 5.1.5, Prototype Pollution is possible in immutable via the mergeDeep(), mergeDeepWith(), merge(), Map.toJS(), and Map.toObject() APIs. This issue has been patched in versions 3.8.3, 4.3.7, and 5.1.5. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Client-Side Caching (CSC) Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| OPNsense core before 26.7.8 contains a log injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to plant victim IP addresses in the lockout_handler by submitting crafted WebGUI login usernames. Attackers can submit usernames like 'Invalid user <victim-ip>' repeatedly to add the victim to the sshlockout table, blocking SSH and WebGUI access and killing its pf states. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: reset skb headers before unicast and multicast filtering
Socket filters can use SKF_NET_OFF and SKF_LL_OFF to read relative to
an skb's network and MAC headers. Netlink producers may reserve
headroom without resetting those headers, allowing a receiving socket's
filter to read data before the initialized message.
For example, IWPM HELLO replies are allocated with dev_alloc_skb(),
which reserves NET_SKB_PAD bytes. An unprivileged NETLINK_RDMA user can
attach a classic socket filter and disclose this headroom through the
length of the delivered reply. The resets in netlink_dump() do not help
because IWPM sends a separately allocated skb through netlink_unicast().
Reset both headers before running the receiver's filter in unicast and
broadcast delivery, as is already done for dump skbs. This also covers
other netlink producers that reserve headroom without changing their
allocation or message-building code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Fix race in discovery auth updates
Separate configfs opens can concurrently update the discovery AuthMethod
parameter. Both callers may free the same value in
iscsi_update_param_value(), causing a double-free.
Protect the lookup and replacement with the discovery TPG access lock,
as used by the other TPG configfs parameter updates. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
calipso: keep BIG TCP payload_len in calipso_skbuff_setattr()
calipso_skbuff_setattr() adjusts payload_len by the length of the
option it inserts or resizes:
payload = ntohs(ip6_hdr->payload_len);
ip6_hdr->payload_len = htons(payload + len_delta);
GRO can build BIG TCP packets larger than IPV6_MAXPLEN, and stores
payload_len == 0 for them; ipv6_payload_len() then falls back to
skb->len. For such a packet forwarded to a destination mapped to
CALIPSO, the code above writes len_delta (or 65536 + len_delta when
shrinking) into payload_len, and ipv6_payload_len() no longer falls
back to skb->len. nf_tables, conntrack and sch_cake rely on it.
The same arithmetic also wraps when a packet grows past IPV6_MAXPLEN,
and a BIG TCP packet that shrinks below IPV6_MAXPLEN should get its
real length back.
Set payload_len from the skb length with ipv6_set_payload_len(), which
stores 0 above IPV6_MAXPLEN and the real length otherwise, as
ipv6_gro_complete() does. The network header was just reset to
skb->data, so skb->len - sizeof(*ip6_hdr) is the payload length.
Tested on one kernel (arm64, QEMU) with SELinux permissive, a minimal
mdp-generated policy (network_peer_controls=1), "netlabelctl calipso
add pass doi:16" and a NetLabel mapping of fd00:2::/64 to CALIPSO
DOI 16. calipso_skbuff_setattr() was called through
netlbl_skbuff_setattr() from a test-only debugfs hook (not part of
this patch) adding a level-only label; payload_len after the call:
case before fix after fix real length
1000, unlabeled 1016 1016 1016
70000 GSO, payload_len 0 16 0 70016
65530 GSO, grows past MAXPLEN 10 0 65546
65540 GSO with a 24 byte hop
header, shrinks below MAXPLEN 65528 65532 65532
1000 with a 24 byte hop header 992 992 992
(0 means ipv6_payload_len() returns the real length.) On the forward
path, with a client injecting unlabeled UDP through a router to a
server, the router adds the CALIPSO option and the server delivers all
datagrams (Udp6InDatagrams 5, Ip6InTruncatedPkts 0) with this patch. |
